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Abstract
This Essay begins by rejecting the reasoning of the joined cases Keck & Mithouard. After
discussing what passes for reasoning in this case, this Essay examines the case law before and
after Keck in order to attempt to draw some conclusions about the consequences of Keck for the
earlier case law and about the application of Article 30 since Keck. In part through a comparison
with recent case law on EC Treaty Article 59, the conclusion is that the case law on Article 30 has
developed in an extremely unfortunate and unsystematic direction, but also that the unity of the
internal market within the Community has at the end of the day not been unduly endangered.
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INTRODUCTION
The title "Two Years After Keck" gives the impression of a
celebration or remembrance of an important event, certainly an
event where the consequences may fittingly be discussed in
honor of Professor Due's distinguished tenure of office at the
European Court of Justice ("Court of Justice" or "Court"). Nor-
bert Reich has rightly written of a November revolution at the
Court of Justice in Luxembourg.1 As far as Article 302 is con-
cerned, it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of: an evolution
in approach, little new in the concrete result, a great deal of dis-
satisfaction about the absence of reasoning, and, more regretta-
bly, another nail in the coffin of systematic reasoning and coher-
ent analysis.
I. KECK & MITHOUARD
The facts in the Cases Keck & Mithouard3 ("Keck") are well
* Professor of European Law; Rijksuniversiteit Groningen; Visiting Professor of EC
Law, University College London & UniversitAt Bremen; Professor at the College of Eu-
rope; Barrister, Houthoff, Amsterdam & Rotterdam. This Essay is adapted from a paper
presented to the Dutch Association for Competition Law in June 1995.
1. Norbert Reich, The "November Revolution" of the European Court of Justice: Keck,
Meng and Audi Revisited, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 495 (1994).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 30, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573, 602 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247
[hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-II) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1
(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EURO-
PEAS COMMUNITY (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
3. Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267/91 and 2-268/91,
[1993] E.C.R. 1-6097 [hereinafter Keck]; see Ackermann (1994) RIW 189; Berr (1994)
JDInt. 491; Chalmers (1994) 19 ELRev. 385; Gormley (1994) 5 EBLR 63;Joliet (1994)
JdT (Dr. Eur.) 145 & (1994) GRURInt. 979; Mattera (1994) RMUE 117; Mok (1994)
TVVS 20; Mortelmans (1994) SEW 115 & 236; Odle (1994) IER 65; Petschke (1994)
EuZW 107; W.-H. Roth, Joined Cases C-267 and C-268/91, Bernard Keck and Daniel
Mithouard; Case C-292/92, Ruth Hunermund et al. v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wurttem-
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known. Keck and Mithouard were prosecuted for reselling Sai
rouge coffee and Picon beer at a loss.4 It is perhaps less widely
realized that there was no indication on the facts that these
products had been imported from other Member States. The
Court of Justice should, therefore, have sent these cases back to
the French court, stating that there appeared to be no questions
of Community law involved.'
But, laying this objection to one side, the reasoning in Keck
is still unacceptable. The reasoning is not simply conspicuous by
its absence, it is remarkable, it may be said with Biesheuvel, for
its arrogance. After discussing what passes for reasoning in this
case, this Essay examines the case law before and after Keck in
order to attempt to draw some conclusions about the conse-
quences of Keck for the earlier case law and about the applica-
tion of Article 30 since Keck. In part through a comparison with
recent case law on EC Treaty Article 59, the conclusion is that
the case law on Article 30 has developed in an extremely unfor-
tunate and unsystematic direction, but also that the unity of the
internal market within the Community has at the end of the day
not been unduly endangered.
The first point in Keck, other than the preliminary objection
already mentioned, is that the Court does not derogate from its
previous definition of the concept of a measure having
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports. It con-
firms that the basic principle in Dassonville is still the point of
departure.' This principle is an object or effects doctrine, not
berg, with annotation by W.-H. Roth, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 845 (1994); Schilling
(1994) EuR 50, & Steindorff (1994) ZHR 149.
4. See, e.g., Products in an unaltered state at lower than their actual purchase price,
contrary to Law No. 63-628 of July 2, 1963, art. 1 (as amended by Order 86-1243 of
December 1, 1986, art. 32).
5. See, e.g., Gormley in (1994) 5 EBLR 63 at 66 and by Sack (1994) EWS 37 at 44,
and acknowledged by Joliet in inter alia (1994) JDT (Dr. Eur.) 145 at 150. Joliet's re-
joinder that the application of Article 30 had never been refused on that ground is,
with great respect, unconvincing. The Court was (rightly) perfectly willing to refuse to
invoke Article 52 in wholly domestic circumstances. See Minist~re public v. Gauchard,
Case 20/87, [1987] E.C.R. 4879, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 489. Further, the Court has always
refused to rule on artificial disputes sent to it under Article 177, even though a few
doubtful cases have slipped through over the years.
6. Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville et al, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852, [1974]
2 C.M.L.R. 436, 448.
7. The Court has consistently held that any measure which is capable of directly or
indirectly, actually or potentially, hindering intra-Community trade constitutes a mea-
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merely a principle that looks to the intention behind a measure.
Thus, the intention to hinder intra-Community trade is not a
precondition to find a breach of Article 30.8 This point is simply
demonstrated because had it ever been necessary to show that
legislation intended to hinder trade between Member States, the
Commission would never have been able to win the Reinhei-
tsgebot9 case against Germany, as the legislation involved had ex-
isted in one form or other for centuries before the establishment
of the Community. Intention is relevant in deciding whether a
measure which at first sight is justified in fact forms a means of
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade be-
tween Member States, and thus is unacceptable in Community
law.1" This makes it immediately apparent just how irrelevant
the observation by the Court in Keck, that the French measure
was not designed to regulate trade between Member States, re-
ally is.'1 The Court admitted that the French legislation was ca-
pable of restricting the volume of sales and, thus, the volume of
products sold by Member States, because it deprived traders of a
particular method of sales promotion. 2
What then followed appears to be incompatible with the
sure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction. Keck, [1994] E.C.R. 1-6097,
6130.
8. See Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v. Weinvertreibs-GmbH,
Case 95/82, [1981] E.C.R. 1217, 1226 (intention to hinder intra-Community trade is
sufficient to find breach of Articles 30 or 34 EC respecting discriminatory rules); P.B.
Groenveld BV v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, Case 15/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3409,
[1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 207, 211; Re: Imports of Poultry Meat: EC Commission v. United
Kingdom, Case 40/82, [1982] E.C.R. 2793, 2825-26, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 497, 535 (indi-
cating intention to hinder intra-Community trade is sufficient to find breach of Articles
30 or 34 more generally).
9. Re Purity Requirements for Beer: EC Commission v. Germany, Case 178/84,
[1987] E.C.R. 1227, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 780 (indicating that original provisions dated
from old Bavarian brewing tradition given formal recognition in Reinheitsgebot
adopted in Bavaria in 1516). See also Re Beer Purity Standards: EC Commission v.
Greece, Case 176/84, [1987] E.C.R. 1193, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 813.
10. See, e.g., Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 40/82, [1982] E.C.R. 2793,
2826, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 497, 535.
11. See Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q PLC (formerly B & Q (Retail) Ltd.),
Case C-145/88, [1989] E.C.R. 3851, 3889, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 337, 343; Quietlynn Ltd. et
al. v. Southend Borough Council, Case C-23/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3059, 3081, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. 55, 66; H. Krantz GmbH & Co. v. Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen et al.,
Case C-69/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-583, 597, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 677, 687; Council of the City
of Stoke-on-Trent et al. v. B & Q plc, Case C-169/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6635, 6657, [1993]
1 C.M.L.R. 426, 464 (showing same observation prior to Keck, often standing entirely
alone from other reasoning).
12. Keck, [1993] E.C.R. at 1-6130.
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very clear approach in Van de Haar s and Prantl,14 where the
Court expressly rejected attempts to introduce a de minimis prin-
ciple into Article 30. The Court posed the question whether the
possibility of such a restriction was sufficient to characterize the
legislation in question as a measure having equivalent effect to a
quantitative restriction on imports. In an attempt to answer that
question, the Court looked at the increasing tendency of traders
to invoke Article 30 in order to challenge any rules whose effect
was to limit their commercial freedom, even where such rules
were not aimed at products from other Member States. This ten-
dency was the basis for the decision by the Court to re-examine
its case law and, allegedly, to clarify it.
For this purpose the Court referred to its judgment in Cassis
de Dijon.15 The English text at this point in Keck is in fact slightly
wider drawn than the French. The English text states that:
In "Cassis de Dijon" it was held that, in the absence of
harmonisation of legislation, measures of equivalent effect
prohibited by Article 30 include obstacles to the free move-
ment of goods where they are the consequence of applying
rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods
(such as requirements as to designation, form, size, weight,
composition, presentation, labelling, packaging) to goods
from other Member States where they are lawfully manufac-
tured and marketed, even if those rules apply without distinc-
tion to all products, unless their application can be justified
by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free
movement of goods.
16
The French text states that:
Il y a lieu de constater que, conformement i lajurisprudence
Cassis de Dijon, constituent des mesures d'effet 6quivalent,
interdites par larticle 30, les obstacles 1 la libre circulation
des marchandises... (further as in English).
The English "include" makes it clear that this description is illus-
13. Van de Haar et al., Joined Cases 177/82 & 178/82, [1984]. E.C.R. 1797, 1812-
13.
14. Criminal proceedings against Pranti, Case 16/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1299, 1326,
[1985) 2 C.M.L.R. 238. See Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e.V. v. Yves
Rocher GmbH, Case C-126/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2361, 2390.
15. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Branntwein, Case 120/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494 [hereinafter Cassis deDijon].
16. Keck, [1993] E.C.R. at 1-6131 (emphasis added).
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trative and not restrictive, thus that such conditions are not the
only measures which fell under Article 30. It has never seriously
been argued, however, that the Cassis case law was an exhaustive
statement of the ambit of Article 30.17
But the departure from earlier case law was to be clear and
explicit. The Court observed that:
[C] ontrary to what had previously been decided, the applica-
tion to products from other Member States, of national pro-
visions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements
is not such as to hinder, directly or indirectly, actually or po-
tentially, trade within the meaning of the Dassonville judg-
ment, provided that those provisions apply to all affected
traders operating within the national territory and provided
that they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the
marketing of domestic products and of those from other
Member States.1 8
Provided that these conditions were satisfied, the Court con-
cluded that the application of such rules to the sale of products
from another Member State, which meeting the requirements
laid down by that State, was not by nature such as to impede
their access to the market or to impede access any more than it
impeded the access of domestic products. 9 Such rules thus fell
outside the scope of Article 30, and so the answer to the national
court was that Article 30 did not apply to national rules imposing
a general prohibition on resale at a loss.2 0
II. A CONFLUENCE OF PROBLEMS: TWO STREAMS MIXED
TOGETHER
Although Mortelmans2 1 is of the opinion that this judgment
is not a surprise, the reasoning, although not the result, is in-
deed very much a surprise. It seems that the Court has tried to
bring together two separate streams of case law dealing with
questions which, while related, are in fact distinct. These two
17. See, e.g., Re Buy Irish Campaign: EC Commission v. Ireland, Case 249/81,
[1982] E.C.R. 4005, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 104; Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v. UnitA
sanitaria locale No 2 di Carrara, Case 2188, [1990] E.C.R. 1-889, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 25
(indicating policy of preference for national products incompatible with Article 30).
18. Keck, [1993] E.C.R. at 1-6131.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Mortelmans (1994) SEW 115 at 120.
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streams are on the one hand the "police powers" cases,22 and on
the other hand the cases dealing with methods of sale that bear
no relationship to the products themselves but deal with meth-
ods of sales promotion, such as advertising or inducements to
purchase. Although it is true that the reason for the many chal-
lenges to legislation concerning shop closing on Sundays was to
increase sales, such legislation is, in fact, to be seen as a measure
dealing with the local regulation of socio-economic life.
Measures concerning planning also fall within this category.
But the problems had already started here prior to Keck. Is a
prohibition of advertisements on hoardings by the roadside in-
compatible with Article 30? Provided that there is no discrimina-
tion, the conclusion ought to have been that such a measure was
not prohibited by Community Law,23 yet the Court had found
such a restriction was, in principle, incompatible with Article
30.24 There was little doubt that Article 30 was becoming a
touchstone for testing socio-economic questions and that the
22. See Quietlynn, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3059, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 55 (discussing sex shop
licensing). See Blesgen v. Belgium, Case 75/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1211, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R.
431 (same result achieved, albeit by controversial reasoning). See also, GORMLEV,
PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC 55-56, 252-53 (1985); PETER OLI-
VER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EEC 88, 157-59 (2d ed. 1988) (regarding sale of
strong drink in cafes); Criminal Proceedings Against Sergius Oebel, Case 155/80 (Eur.
Ct. J. 1993) (not yet reported). See also Gornley, supra note 5, at 64-65, 100-03, 252;
OLIVER, supra, 88-89, 100-03 (regarding night work in bakeries and associated restric-
tions on transport and distribution). These judgments deviate significantly from the
general line of pre-Keck reasoning but are explicable as concerning "police powers"
measures. Blesgen was indeed a case where the integration merit was zero. The reason-
ing was based on the view that the Belgian Loi Vandervelde regulated local socio-eco-
nomic life and there was no real link between intra-Community trade and the sale of
strong drink in cafes. Blesgen should in fact have been decided on the basis of public
policy (in casu maintenance of public order) under Article 36. The genuineness (or
otherwise) of the alleged health justification advanced in Blesgen (protection of young
people from the evils of strong drink) may be judged from the fact that a few years later
the law was repealed and replaced by a licensing system (and much revenue was raised
thereby). Blesgen can be seen as being based on a remoteness test. See Krantz, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-583, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 677; CMC Motorradcenter GmbH v. Baskiciogullari,
Case C-93/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5009, 5021, [1993]. See also Direction g6n6rale des im-
p6ts et al. v. Forest et al., Case 148/75, [1986] E.C.R. 3449, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 577.
23. The message should not be prohibited by Community Law as a legitimate
socio-econdmic policy choice. Even adherents to the wide scope of Article 30, such as
the present author, would not have sought to challenge non-discriminatory restrictions
on advertising hoardings. Article 30 does not deserve a reputation akin to that of patri-
otism (the last refuge of a scoundrel: Dr. Johnson). Laurence Gormley, Recent Case Law
on Articles 30-36 EEC: Some Hot Potatoes, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 825, 826 (1990).
24. See Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA et al. v. Departamento de Sanidad y
Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Catalufia, Joined Cases C-1 & 176/90, [1991]
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Court was being asked to rule frequently on how far Article 30
affected such measures.
III. THE SITUATION BEFORE KECK
Although there was considerable dissatisfaction about the
reasoning in Torfaen,25 which concerned shop closing on Sun-
day, it was already clear before Keck that the Court had accepted
that such measures were caught by the concept of measures hav-
ing equivalent effect, but were justified as legitimate socio-eco-
nomic policy choices.2 6 The Court of Justice had, therefore, al-
ready decided that such measures forming part of the general
local regulation of socio-economic life would not be prohibited,
provided that they did not discriminate against goods from other
Member States and that they did not have a more far-reaching
effect on trade between Member States than inherent in the le-
gitimate nature of such measures. In other words, the measures
were acceptable under Article 30 so long as they were not dispro-
portionate and did not form a means of arbitrary discrimination
or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.27
Thus, attacks on shop closing laws really made no sense any
more: the result was already clear, although this did not in fact
deter other cases being brought. "8 But in Keck, the Court de-
parted from this line of reasoning. Instead of concluding that
the measures were capable of hindering inter-state trade but
E.C.R. 1-4151, 4183 (upholding legislation as being justified on health protection
grounds under Article 36).
25. See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 23, at 141.
26. See Union d6partementale des syndicats CGT de l'Aisne v. SIDEF Conforama
et al., Case C,-312/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-997, 1025, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 746, 767; The State
of Belgium v. Andre Marchandise, Case C-332/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1027, 1041, [1993] 3
C.M.L.R. 746, 767; Stoke-on-Trent, (1992] E.C.R. 1-6335, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 426, 464
(concluding that measures werejustified). In Tcrfaen, the Court simply stated the rele-
vant criteria against which the national court had to examine the measure and it left it
to the national court to draw decide whether the laws were disproportionate or not.
Torfaen, [1989] E.C.R. 3851, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 337.
27. The prohibition on disproportionate measures, arbitrary discrimination and
disguised restrictions on trade is the criterion of the second sentence of Article 36.
However, it applies also when evaluation takes place under the rule of reason. See
Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville et al, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 436, 443 (applying rule of reason for first time); Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R.
at 664, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 494 (refining rule of reason).
28. See Criminal proceedings against Tankstation 't Heuske vofandJBE Boermans,
Joined Cases C-401/92 & 402/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2199; Punto Casa SpA v. Sindaco del
Commune di Capena et al., Joined Cases C-69/93 & 258/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2355.
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were justified in the interest of consumer protection, which
would have been a perfectly sustainable approach, the Court re-
moved any possibility of Community-level examination of the
measure by concluding that the measure was not capable of hin-
dering inter-state trade within the meaning of Dassonville. But
Keck should not be compared with the "police powers" cases. It
concerned a particular method of sales promotion, not through
advertising as such, although no doubt the supermarket con-
cerned did advertise its special offers, or even through longer
opening hours. Keck really should be seen - and has been ap-
proached - in line with the cases dealing with consumer protec-
tion. The fact that the Court spoke of "selling arrangements"
rather than "sales methods" made it clear that the Court did not
intend to restrict its dictum to such methods: it extended to cir-
cumstances which themselves had nothing to do with the prod-
uct or its presentation.
In a series of judgments prior to Keck, the Court had dis-
cussed various selling methods or practices.29 In order to essay a
conclusion as to whether previous judgments would now be de-
cided or at least reasoned differently, it may be helpful to recall
the approach taken in these cases. Oosthoek3° concerned a prohi-
bition on offering inducements to purchase gifts that were not
usually used or consumed at the same time as the product being
sold. The Court found that this was capable of hindering trade
between Member States, but was justified in the interest of con-
sumer protection. In Buet,31 the Court analyzed the general pro-
hibition on doorstep selling, which in casu prevented house-to-
house sales of language course material imported from other
29. Criminal proceedings against Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij BV, Case
286/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4575, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 428; R. Buet and Educational Business
Services (EBS) SARL v. Ministre Public, Case 382/87, [1989] E.C.R. 1235, [1993] 3
C.M.L.R. 659; GB-INNO-BM v. Conf~d~ration du Commerce luxembourgeois, Case C-
362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-667, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801; The Republic (France) v. Jean-
Marie Delattre, Case C-369/88. [1991] E.C.R. 1-1487, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 445; SCP
Boscher, Studer et Fromentin v. SA British Motors Wright et al., Case C-239/90, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-2023, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 410; Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA e.a. v.
Departmento de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Catalufia, Joined
Cases C-1/90 & 176/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4151; Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der
Wirtschaft v. Yves Rocher GmbH, Case C-126/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2361.
30. Criminal proceedings against Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappi BV, [1982]
E.C.R 4575, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 428.
31. R. Buet and Educational Business Services (EBS) SARL v. Minist~re Public,
[1989] E.C.R. 1235, [1993] 3.C.M.L.R. 659.
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Member States. The Court found the prohibition to be an obsta-
cle to imports, as it deprived the trader of the method of market-
ing whereby he realized almost all his sales, but one that was
justified in the interest of consumer protection because it pre-
vented the purchase on the doorstep of unsuitable or low-quality
material which could compromise the consumer's chance of ob-
taining further training and thus consolidating his position on
the labor market.
In GB-INNO-BM, 2 the freedom of consumers was found to
be compromised if they were deprived of access to advertising
available in the Member State where the purchases were made.
Thus, the prohibition on the distribution of leaflets advertising
temporary price cuts was examined in the light of Articles 30-36
of the Treaty and the Court concluded that it was not justified
on the ground of consumer protection.33 This case did not ex-
amine roadside advertising hoardings, which could be thought
of as falling under "police powers," or television advertising,
which is examined under Article 59 relating to the freedom to
provide and receive services. GB-INNO-BM can be seen, how-
ever, as the high-water mark of the freedom of information for
the consumer and for the consumer's liberty to make up his or
her own mind without being subject to undue pressure, a consid-
eration that clearly played a part in the judgment on doorstep
selling in Buet.3 4
In Delattre,3 the Court dealt with a pharmacist's monopoly
on the sale of medicinal and certain other products. Here, the
Court decided that the monopoly was capable, insofar as it re-
stricted sales to certain channels, of affecting the sales possibili-
ties of marketing imported products, and was thus a measure
having equivalent effect within the meaning of Article 30. For
pharmaceutical products, however, this monopoly was justified
on the basis of Article 36.36 For other products, the Court left it
32. GB-INNO-BM, [1990] E.C.R. 1-667, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801.
33. GB-INNO-BM, [1990] E.C.R. 1-667 at 688-68.
34. Buet, [1989] E.C.R. at 1252-53.
35. Criminal proceedings against Jean-Marie Delattre, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1487,
[1993] 2 C.M.L.R 445.
36. The justification for such products could, in general, be presumed. However,
evidence could be produced that, in relation to certain pharmaceutical products whose
use would not involve any serious danger to public health, the inclusion in the monop-
oly was manifestly disproportionate. This represents an important shifting of the bur-
den of proof, as normally, it is for the body seeking to restrain importation to show that
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to the national court to decide whether the monopoly was neces-
sary for the protection of public health or consumers, and
whether these aims could be attained by measures less restrictive
of trade between Member States.37
In Boscher,3 s the Court found that national legislation that
imposed, on a seller or owner, the requirement of prior entry in
the trade register at the place where an auction took place
before he could sell second-hand goods in casu vehicles was an
unjustified restriction on inter-state trade, as it obliged the
owner either to sell through a trader operating at the place of
sale or to refrain from selling the goods by public auction. In
the Court's view this was a disproportionate requirement and
could not be justified either on the ground of consumer protec-
tion or on the Article 36 ground of public policy: there existed
less restrictive measures that the French authorities could have
taken to protect these interests.39
In Aragonesa,40 the Court noted that it had already decided
that legislation, which restricted or prohibited certain forms of
advertising and certain means of sales promotion, although it
did not directly affect trade, could be such as to restrict the vol-
ume of trade because it affected market opportunities. How-
ever, in that particular case, the State's interest in protecting the
public health, was capable of justifying the restriction on adver-
tising in certain places. There was, furthermore, no evidence
that the legislation was a means, even an indirect means, of pro-
tecting certain local products. This case, like Blesgen,41 dealt with
public policy (planning) considerations in conjunction with
health protection arguments. In Aragonesa, the reasoning was
based solely on the protection of public health as set out in Arti-
the restraint is justified. See, e.g., Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v. Minister ffir
Ernihrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 251/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 3369, 3392, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 513, 536. See also Criminal proceedings
against Sandoz BV, Case 174/82, [1983] E.C.R. at 2464-65 (regarding duty of co-opera-
tion).
37. Delattre, [1991] E.C.R. 1540-41, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 485 (required reference
to average, well-informed consumer). See The Republic v. Jean Monteil and Daniel
Samanni, Case C-60/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1547, 1570-72, [1992] 3 C.M.L.R. 442, 459;
Laboratoire de proth~ses oculaires (LPO) v. Union nationale des syndicats d'opticiens
de France (UNSOF) et al., Case C-271/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2898.
38. Boscher, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2023, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 410.
39. Id. at 2039-40, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 426.
40. Aragonesa, [1991] E.C.R. at 4185-87.
41. Blesgen, [1982] E.C.R. 1211, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 431.
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cle 36 (health and life of humans). The Court's reasoning was
not based on the rule of reason, 42 nor was it based on public
policy considerations. Where the core of the justification lies in
another Article 36 heading, this alternative justification is pre-
ferred to any attempt at justification on the grounds of public
policy.
The final judgment on sales methods prior to Keck was Yves
Rocher.43 This case concerned the advertising of price reductions
in publicity materials, a type of advertising that was considered
to be attention-grabbing. 4 Consistent with its earlier judgments,
the Court found that the prohibition on this form of advertising
was capable of hindering inter-state trade. The Court then con-
cluded that the prohibition was disproportionate and that it was,
in fact, useful for consumers to be informed about price reduc-
tions.
It is evident from all these judgments that the Court was of
the view that although the legislation concerned applied to do-
mestic and imported products alike, the fact that a foreign un-
dertaking had to adapt its sales publicity or other sales methods
or was prevented from using them, was sufficient to conclude
that inter-state trade was hindered. The Court then went on to
examine the justifications advanced, to see if the interests in-
volved were indeed justified and proportionate, so as to render
the restriction on trade acceptable; it concluded that they were
not.4 5 This approach could indeed have perfectly well been fol-
lowed in Keck.
IV. THE SITUATION POST-KECK
In Keck, as has been noted above, the Court clearly was of
the view that it was increasingly being faced with attempts to use
Article 30 to set aside differences in the manner in which con-
sumers were being protected in the various Member States. In
42. Cassis deDijon, [1979] E.C.R. at 662-63, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 512. See GORMLEY,
PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC 63-64 (1985). The Court had
confused matters by including the expression "public health" in the examples of rule of
reason justifications set out in Cassis de Dijon. Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R. at 649,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 494.
43. Yves Rocher, [1993] E.C.R. at 2390.
44. In German, blickfangmissig; in French, publicit6 accrocheuse.
45. Yves Rocher, [1993] E.C.R. at 2390.
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terms of what may be called the "spirit of Edinburgh,"4 6 now that
the emphasis has come to be placed on as little Community in-
tervention as possible. It is understandable that the Court
wished to create clarity on the ambit of Article 30, but the Court
manifestly failed to do that in Keck. If the Court had wanted to
follow the spirit of Edinburgh, it should have either found that
there was no evidence of a Community point being involved or
have stated that the national court could find that the measure
was justified on grounds of consumer protection.
But, save a very few recent cases,4 7 the Court has developed
the tendency to indulge in an elaborate evaluation of the alleged
justification, effectively leaving the national judge little to do
other than mechanically apply the Court of Justice's evaluation.
Effectively, the Court has become the victim of its own success:
once it saw that Torfaen had not addressed the Sunday trading
arguments, it tried to stem the flow of such cases in Conforama,
Marchandise, and Stoke-on-Trent.48 That meant taking a position
on the matter, not simply giving the national court the elements
of Community law on the basis of which it could make up its own
mind. In the consumer protection cases, the Court had long
been providing concrete rulings on whether or not a measure
was justified. It may indeed be difficult to draw the line between
too scant a ruling to be useful and too detailed a ruling which
effectively does the national court's job for it. Nevertheless, it ill
behooves the Court to blame traders for seeking rulings when it
has so manifestly been prepared in the past to give concrete rul-
ings on the traders' issues of concern.
In view of the term "selling arrangements" in Keck, it seems
highly likely that the judgments in Oosthoek and Buet would today
be differently decided; they concerned particular methods of
selling, namely free gifts and doorstep selling. Judge Joliet saw
no reason to draw a distinction between Keck on the one hand
and GB-INNO-BM and Yves Rocher on the other.49 Those latter
46. Edinburgh European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, 25 E.C. BULL.,
no. 12, at 9 (1992).
47. Torfaen, [1989] E.C.R. at 3889, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 337; Delattre, [1991] E.C.R.
1-1487, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 445; Monteul, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1547, [1992] 3 C.M.L.R. 425.
48. Stoke-on-Trent, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6635, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 426.
49. (1994) GRURInt. 979, at 986; (1994) JdT (Dr. Eur.) 145, at 151. Similarly,
Joliet saw no reason to distinguish between Himermund, the Sunday trading cases and
the professional monopoly cases.
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judgments concerned certain advertising practices, but not in re-
lation to what may easily be characterized as real "police powers"
issues or issues relating to consumer protection at the point of
sale (at home or on business premises).
Shortly after Keck, the Court handed down its judgment in
Hiinermund et al. v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wiirttemberg,0
where it decided, referring solely to Keck, that a professional rule
laid down by an association of pharmacists that prohibited phar-
macists from advertising para-pharmaceutical products outside
their pharmacies, although they were allowed to sell such prod-
ucts, was not prohibited by Article 30.
In Commission v. Greece,51 the Court rejected a challenge to a
Greek law requiring that infant formulae and follow-on formulae
milk be sold only in pharmacies, except in municipalities where
there was no pharmacy, in which cases the products could be
sold in other shops. The Court thereby rejected the argument
that since processed milk for infants was produced in Greece the
measure in reality only affected imported products. It found the
Greek rules non-discriminatory with respect to the origin of the
product and that the applicability of Article 30 to such a measure
could not depend on such a purely fortuitous factual circum-
stance that could change with time. If it were otherwise, the
Court concluded, the illogical consequence would be that the
same legislation would be prohibited under Article 30 in certain
Member States but allowed in other Member States. Only if it
were apparent that the legislation protected domestic products
which were similar to or in competition with processed milk
from other Member States would the result be different, and no
evidence to this effect had been adduced.
This unconvincing judgment is wholly at odds with Advo-
cate General Lenz's carefully reasoned Opinion,52 in which he
noted that in accordance with the pre- and post-Keck case law the
pharmacists' monopoly had to be viewed as a measure having
equivalent effect. The consequence of applying Keck was that
the Court did not even reach the question of whether the phar-
macists' monopoly could be justified as a measure designed to
50. Hiinermund et al. v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wiirttemberg, Case 292/92,
[1993] E.C.R. 1-6787.
51. Commission v. Greece, Case C-391/92, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1621.
52. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Commission v. Greece, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1621,
1630.
TWO YEARS AFTER KECK
protect the health and life of humans, and, thus, a valid deroga-
tion under Article 36.
In its judgments in the Delattre5 3 and Monteil54 cases, the
Court had stressed the need to evaluate the alleged reasonable-
ness of monopoly positions for products which were not pharma-
ceutical products. What was sauce for the national judge was not
sauce for the Court of Justice. It appears, therefore, that both
Delattre and Monteil would, at the very least in respect of products
other than pharmaceuticals, now be decided differently. More-
over, the Court's approach in Commission v. Greece55 resurrects a
preference for one channel of trade, something against which it
had originally set its face in Dassonville, and effectively supports a
monopoly that cannot be justified on public interest grounds
(such as health protection).
After Hiinermund, it became clear that the advertising cam-
paigns in GB-INNO-BM and Yves Rocher would now not be open
to examination under Article 30.56 In his Opinion in
Hiinermund, Advocate General Tesauro invited the Court to state
expressly which judgments had been "overruled" by Keck, but the
Court declined to respond. Mr. Tesauro mentioned the Sunday
trading cases, such as Conforama and Stoke-on-Trent. He also cited
the judgments in: Delattre, Monteil, Boscher, LPO, and Aragonesa.
Not until the judgment in Sociiti d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-
Siplec v. TFI Publiciti SA et al.57 was it expressly stated that advertis-
ing campaigns, in casu televised advertising, were caught by the
Keck doctrine as a particular form of sales promotion for a partic-
ular form of marketing products (distribution). An attempt to
prohibit advertisements placed on the packaging of the products
themselves was, however, subjected to Article 30 examination in
Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe, K6ln v. Mars GmbH.5"
Advocate General Gulman, in his Opinion in Lucien Orscheit
53. Delattre, [1991] E.C.R. 1-487, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 445.
54. Monteil and Samanni, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1547, [1992] 3 C.M.L.R. 442.
55. Commission v. Greece, [1995] E.C.R. I-nyr.
56. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Socit6 d'Importation ldouard
Leclerc-Siplec v. TFI Publicit SA et al., Case C-412/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-179 at 193.
57. Soci~t6 d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TFI Publicit6 SA et al., Case C-
412/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-179 at 193.
58. Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe, Ki'ln v. Mars GmbH, Case C-470/93,
[1995] E.C.R. 1-1923. This was scarcely surprising as it concerned a "+ 10%" marking
on the packaging and the question of the manner in which that was presented. Such
questions are caught fair and square by the Keck doctrine.
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GmbH v. Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel GmbH,5 9 regarded the case law
on selling arrangements prior to Keck as inapplicable as long as
the conditions set out in Keck were met. However, the fact that
certain principles from the pre-Keck case law are still cited by the
Court well after Keck proves that those judgments are still not
without some significance.6 °
Yet, the Court has maintained its stance. In Tankstation 't
Heukske vof et al.6 and Punto Casa SpA v. Sindaco del Commune di
Capena et al.,62 the Court turned its back on the solution adopted
in the earlier Sunday trading cases of Conforama, Marchandise,
and Stoke-on-Trent where it had held that non-discriminatory
shop closing laws were acceptable. Keck was applied. Advocate
General Van Gerven observed that "all other63 national measures
applicable without distinction also fall in principle within the
new Keck and Mithouard case-law, in so far as, unlike product re-
quirements, they do not necessitate any adaptation of the intrin-
sic or extrinsic characteristics of the products imported."64 Mr.
Van Gerven did not express a concluded view on the question of
whether the Court had in reality opted for a test of discrimina-
tion in fact in looking at measures applicable to domestic and
imported products alike.65 It was not possible, he felt, to exclude
the possibility out of hand that some measures, albeit not dis-
criminatory in that broad sense, might nevertheless be capable,
on an overall view, of impeding, actually or potentially, directly
or indirectly, trade between Member States in some other way.66
59. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulman, Lucien Orscheit GmbH v. Eurim-Pharm
Arzneimittel GmbH, Case 320/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5243, 5248.
60. See Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb e.V. v. Clinique Laboratoires SNC et al., Case
C-315/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-317, 336 (citing Buet's principle of proportionality): Ligur
Carni Sr e.a. v. Uniti sanitaria locale No XV di Genova et al., Joined Cases C-277/91,
3i8/91, and 319/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6221, 6661 (citing Aragonesa, no escape from find-
ing of discrimination because provision applied only to part of national territory).
61. Tankstation I Heukske vof et al.,Joined Cases C-401/92 and C-402/92, [1994]
E.C.R. 1-2199.
62. Punto Casa SpA v. Sindaco del Commune di Capena et al., Joined Cases C-69/93
and C-258/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2355.
63. Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Tankstation 't Heukske vof et al.,
[1994] E.C.R. at 1-2220. See, e.g., measures not satisfying the test in Keck and, if there
are no other circumstances suggesting that the legislation, on an overall view, impedes
intra-Community trade. Id.
64. Tankstation t Heukske vof et al., [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2220.
65. Id. at 2218.
66. In which case the pre-Keck case law would apply and the effect of Keck would be
to reverse the burden of proof. See also Delattre, [1991] E.C.R 1-1487, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R.
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It appears from the judgment in Ligur Carni Srl et al. v. Unitd
sanitaria locale No XV di Genova et al.67 that the Court may be in-
clined to agree, although thisjudgment may perhaps simply con-
firm the doctrine that Article 30 applies to measures irrespective
of the origin of the product if the measures do indeed make
importation of products from other Member States more diffi-
cult. Most recently, on August 11, 1995, the Court applied Keck
to decide that a prohibition on resale at a very low profit margin
fell outside the scope of Article 30.6"
V. DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX?
Despite the strong criticism levelled against the Court in the
literature69 and by Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in
TFI Publicitd, the Court appears, as yet, less than wholly inclined
to review Keck. The application of the rule of reason approach
would have offered the flexibility to maintain Community super-
vision to safeguard against abuse by Member States and safe-
guard against abuse of Community law by litigants. The reaction
of Mattera and the present writer has concentrated on the pau-
city of reasoning in Keck, an approach which clearly did not en-
dear Mattera to Joliet.7" If the Court was determined to change
its approach so comprehensively, particularly when a clear line
of recent judgments was apparently being overruled, it should
445. Mr. Van Gerven invited the Court to state whether it was in fact reversing the
burden of proof, but again, the Court was not pleased to respond. Id.
67. Ligur Carni Sri et al. v. Unite sanitaria locale No XV di Genova et al.,Joined Cases
C-277, 318 & 319/91, [19931 E.C.R. 1-6621, 6661. This case concerned, inter alia, a rule
preventing the imposition by a municipality of a rule preventing an importer of fresh
meat from making his own transportation and delivery arrangements within the area of
that authority, unless he paid the local concessionaire a fee corresponding to its
charges relating to handling, transportation and delivery in the local slaughterhouse.
68. Groupement National des N~gociants en Pommes de Terre de Belgique v. ITM
Belgium SA et al., Case 63/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-2467.
69. See generally Mattera (1994) RMUE 117; Gormley (1994) 5 EBLR 63; Sack;
Steindorff (1994) ZHR 149, supra note 3. It is no coincidence that strongest criticism
has come from those authors who had dealt with many of the Article 30 cases in the
Commission. It has to be admitted, though, that many writers appear to welcome the
Keck judgment. Such joy is, respectfully submitted, grossly premature.
70. Joliet's attack in (1994) JdT (Dr. Eur.) 145 & (1994) GRURInt. 979 is in part
an attempt to whitewash Mattera's views: it is, with respect, perhaps less than wholly
convincing. Joliet's arguments are discussed in detail in the present author's forthcom-
ing book, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EC (2nd. ed. 1997). The
third edition of Oliver's FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EC is expected early in 1996
(Sweet & Maxwell, London). The text of this Essay was completed in November, 1995.
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have based its decision on clear and justified grounds. The mere
observation that traders had an increasing tendency to invoke
Article 30 is no justification for what could be seen as a backdoor
attempt to introduce a de minimis criterion into Article 30. In-
deed, Advocate General Tesauro had warned the Court about
the difficulties inherent in any such temptation.7 ' Yet, the analy-
sis presented by Advocate General Jacobs in TFI Publicite"7 as an
alternative to that in Keck is a pure plea for a clear de minimis
approach for equally applicable measures, although the learned
Advocate General rightly declined to apply such an approach to
discriminatory measures.
Even if Mr. Jacobs's submission concerning equally applica-
ble measures is unacceptable (not least because the threshold
would be more difficult to set than it would be to decide on al-
leged justifications), and even he is decidedly unclear on what
would constitute a significant hindrance to inter-state trade, it is
at least more intellectually honest than the Court's apology for
reasoning in Keck. A significant hindrance of access to the mar-
ket would, in Mr. Jacobs's view, serve as the criterion for equally
applicable measures which did not relate to the specific charac-
teristics of the product.73 The purpose of the measures would,
of course, play a part in the evaluation once that threshold were
crossed. Advocate General Jacobs was entirely right to empha-
size that if the Court wished to go down the de minimis route it
would have to lay down clear criteria.74 But what would those
criteria be? If it were 5% of the relevant product and geographi-
cal market Article 30 analysis would turn into economic analysis,
something the Court has always avoided. A de minimis criterion
in Article 30 is unworkable and the Court should continue to
avoid it.
When arguments were presented years ago that the British
local authorities adopting the London conditions of fitness for
hackney carriages (taxis) were merely small local incidents and
71. See Hfinermund e.a. v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wfirttemberg, Case C-
292/92, [1993] E.C.R. -I-6787, 6810-11.
72. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Socit d'Importation tdouard
Leclerc-Siplec v. TFI Publicit6 SA et al., Case C-412/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-179 at 194-95.
73. See W.-H. Roth, Joined Cases C-267 and C-268/91, Bernard Keck and Daniel
Mithouard; Case C-292/92, Ruth Hunermund et al. v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wurttem-
berg, with annotation by W-H. Roth, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 845, 853 (1994).
74. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Socikt d'Importation tdouard
Leclerc-Siplec v. TFI Publicit SA et al., Case C-412/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-179 at 196.
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that if (which the United Kingdom Government did not accept)
a restriction on trade resulted it was of minimal importance,
some argued that such small matters should be left alone. Yet,
within a few years an ever-increasing number of local authorities
have adopted the conditions of fitness, spreading the London-
style cabs, of which there are now a small number of models
made by different British manufacturers, further throughout the
land, rather like an infection. The moment that the Court ac-
cepts a de minimis argument in Article 30, the descent along a
very slippery slope will have commenced, and as sure as night
follows day it will lead to backdoor market fragmentation.
VI. GENERAL ACCESS TO THE MARKET?
It appears that the Court now places particular weight on
access to the market, even though it appears that this is really
relevant for access to the market of the importing Member State
as a whole, and that the Court is (rightly) still not prepared to
embark on any indications of de minimis criteria. Thus, in Alpine
Investments BV v. Minister van Financiin,75 the Court did not re-
spond to the invitation by the British and Dutch Governments to
apply Keck to a prohibition on cold-calling in the financial serv-
ices sector so as to find that such a prohibition was not caught by
Article 59 on the freedom to provide services. The Court opined
that the application of the measures involved in Keck was not
such as to prevent access by imported goods to the market of the
Member State or to impede such access more than it impeded
access by domestic products.76 In Alpine Investments, the Court
stated that the prohibition on cold-calling by the Member State
in which the service provider was established "deprives the oper-
ators concerned of a rapid and direct technique for marketing
and for contacting potential clients in other Member States. It
therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide
services."7 7 The Court then turned to the evaluation of the justi-
fication of the prohibition and found that it was indeed justified
and proportionate. Keck was not extended to Article 59. It is
true that the Court did not expressly rule out such an extension,
75. Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financi~n, Case C-384/93, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-1141.
76. Alpine Investments, [1995] E.C.R. at 1178.
77. Id. at 1176.
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but the fact that the Court was at pains to draw an unconvincing
distinction between the two cases shows that it was unwilling to
accept the British and Dutch viewpoints at face value.
In Her Majesty's Customs & Excise v. Schindler et aL,78 the
Court refused to go down this path. If a prohibition on cold-
calling and a prohibition on the supply of services in relation to
lotteries (including the advertisement of such services) hinders
market access for the purposes of Article 59, why is a prohibition
on advertisements deemed no longer to form a hindrance to
market access for the purposes of Article 30? Should not GB-
INNO-BM and Aragonesa79 be returned to the drawing board? It
appears, however, regrettably, that this is unlikely to occur.
While Aragonesa is not deprived of all significance, for example,
in relation to the evaluation of a justification on health grounds
and for the relationship between the rule of reason and Article
36, it seems unlikely that the Court will now investigate a prohi-
bition on advertising in terms of Article 30, at least in the ab-
sence of a total ban. As far as GB-INNO-BM is concerned, it ap-
pears that such a prohibition on advertising would not be found
to hinder market access as such: in these circumstances the re-
sult would clearly now be different.
Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that measures deal-
ing with selling methods (having no bearing on the product it-
self) concern the circumstances under which goods are sold,8"
although the actual sale of the product is not hindered or pre-
vented. The effect of the prohibition on cold-calling and on the
provision of lottery information services was that market access
was completely blocked. In this light, the question becomes
whether inter-state trade take place at all. If so, then equally ap-
plicable measures which do not affect the product and have no
discriminatory or disguised restrictive effect on trade between
Member States will escape the ambit of Article 30 after Keck.
This might appear to be a return to the view expressed in Oebel,81
that if inter-state trade remains possible at the macro level (ware-
78. Her Majesty's Customs & Excise v. Schindler et at, Case C-275/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-
1039; see Gormley, Pay Your Money and Take Your Chances, 19 EUR. L. REv. 644 (1994).
79. Aragonesa, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4131.
80. Thus, adopting (in relation to Article 30) the criteria proposed by Eric L.
White, In Search of the Limits to Article 30 EEC, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 235, 246 et. seq.
(1989).
81. Oebel [1981] E.C.R. at 2010.
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houses and intermediaries), non-discriminatory prohibitions on
transport for delivery to individual consumers and retail outlets
only would not infringe Articles 30 or 34. But, an "emergency
brake" is still necessary in order to prevent abuses, in the form of
rank unreasonableness, or arbitrary discrimination, or a dis-
guised restriction on trade between Member States. 2
CONCLUSION
The recent judgments in Ligur Carni83 and Verband Sozialer
Wettbewerb e. V v. Clinique Laboratories SNC et al.8 4 in the context of
Community legislation in the fields concerned, make it clear
that Article 30 still holds a central place as one of the fundamen-
tal principles of Community law. Grosso modo the integrity of the
internal market has been safeguarded, although it is now clear
that the Court will not entertain what it perceives to be attempts
to use Article 30 as an escape mechanism for the avoidance of
the application of national legislation, particularly where the in-
tegrationist merit is somewhat thin. Yet, the Court has in these
cases given scant attention to the quality of its reasoning. It is at
first sight tempting to think that it might have been better after
all if the Court had been more willing to throw the ball back to
the national court, as it did in Torfaen, albeit at the risk of na-
tional courts themselves being unable to form a unanimous view.
But, the Court clearly felt that it had to make its view plain; in-
deed in relation to the later Sunday trading questions, elegantly
so. Certainly, it is very difficult for the Court at the Community
level to determine any sort of general test of national non-dis-
criminatory socio-economic policy choices, and it is perhaps un-
derstandable that the case-by-case approach led to certain frus-
trations. But if the Court excludes the application of Article 30
by definition, there remains no possibility of looking behind the
face of ostensibly innocent measures to discover whether a na-
tional measure really is manifestly disproportionate or a dis-
guised restriction on trade between Member States. This creates
an open season for all sorts of restrictions (like insisting that
82. The phrase, in relation to the second sentence of Art. 36, is from BRANDEL Die
gemeinschaftsrechtliche Missbrauchstabestande bei der Ausubung nationale Schut-
zrechte (Art. 36 Satz 2 EWGV)(1980) GRURInt. 512.
83. Ligur Carni, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6621.
84. Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb e. V., [ 1994] E.C.R. 1-317 (discussing sale of cosmetics
under name "Clinique").
1996]
886 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:866
processed baby milk normally be sold only in pharmacies) which
may create or strengthen local monopolies and now appear im-
mune from Article 30 analysis.
The Dassonville basic principle, combined with the rule of
reason, was certainly sufficient, if properly used, to permit both
the Court of Justice to give guidance and the national courts to
decide in Article 177 proceedings, or the Court of Justice itself to
decide in Article 169 proceedings. But, the Court may have
made life more difficult for itself by its increasing tendency to
decide everything in fine detail, rather than to leave to the na-
tional courts the task clearly allocated to them by indicating,
even clearly, what the requirements of Community law are and
letting national judges decide on the basis of the criteria so es-
tablished. Dassonville did not need to be nuanced; it needed to
be properly applied by the Court of Justice. The reasoning in
Keck has all the hallmarks of the definition of a camel,8 5 and
looks like the product of what might perhaps be called the nar-
rowest of majorities.86
85. A horse, drawn by a committee.
86. Clearly, as the Court only gives one judgment, and the deliberations are secret,
knowledge of the voting will never be known outside the members of the Court itself,
but the paucity of the reasoning in Keck surely gives rise to the suspicion that it was a
hotly contested discussion, with minimal agreement.
